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1. Introduction* 
Creating a sound investment climate is vital for improving the economic performance of 
developing countries. It is a well established empirical regularity that economic growth is 
higher in countries that have higher investment rates (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Moreover, 
economic growth has been shown to reduce poverty, at least in the long run (Dollar and 
Kraay, 2002). Generating investment is thus an important factor in reducing poverty in 
developing countries, which underscores the need for identifying the key characteristics of a 
favourable investment climate. 
 
The greater part of investment in developing countries is generated domestically, currently 
domestic investment (public and private) in developing countries totals about $1 trillion 
(World Bank, 2003, p. xiv). By comparison, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to 
developing countries are at $160 billion. FDI flows have, however, been on a rapidly 
increasing trend in recent decades. Moreover, it is often argued that FDI can have a marked 
impact on productivity, by providing access to technological, managerial and organizational 
skills, or to other resources scarcely available in developing countries. Creating a favourable 
investment climate, is therefore a matter of providing both domestic and foreign sources of 
capital with a suitable environment. 
 
An overview of the literature on the determinants of domestic investment and FDI, reveals 
that there are similarities and differences in the factors that promote the two types of 
investment. For instance, Kolstad and Villanger (2004a) find that combating corruption 
increases domestic investment but has no effect on FDI, whereas political liberalization tends 
to increase FDI but decrease domestic investment. Where the determinants of the two types of 
investment coincide or at least do not conflict, delineating a suitable investment regime is 
fairly straightforward, where they do not, more careful tradeoffs must be made. Moreover, it 
is pertinent to point out that aggregate investment data only takes us so far in mapping the 
preconditions for investment. As revealed in Resmini (2000) and Kolstad and Villanger 
(2004b), determinants of FDI differ significantly between industries, which implies that 
investment policy is sometimes a question of which industries you want to attract. 
 
Easterly and Kraay (2000) find that small states do not have different rates of economic 
growth than larger states. They do, however, find that the growth rate volatility of small states 
is greater than that of larger states. Consequently, they argue that small states should open up 
to international capital movements to diversify risk, which certainly provides a case for 
improving the climate for FDI. The influence of smallness on investment, has not been 
exposed to a similar analysis. Some FDI studies do include population size as an explanatory 
variable, for example, Choi (2003) finds population to be insignificant for FDI inflows. 
Similarly, several studies use regional dummy variables to capture differences between 
regions in generating investment. For instance, Asiedu (2002) finds that investment return, 
infrastructure and openness to trade have less of an impact on FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa than 
elsewhere. None of these studies seem to have used a dummy for the Caribbean countries, 
however. Against this backdrop, we take a closer look at the impact of smallness, and a 
Caribbean location, on domestic investment and FDI. 
 
                                                 
* This article is the result of a joint project with CICERO. The authors thank Gunnar Eskeland for constructive 
comments, and Denis Nikitin for assistance in compiling data. 
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The below figure presents FDI data for 152 countries, according to their population size. The 
score on the vertical axis is the FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, averaged over the period 
1998-2002. The score on the horizontal axis, is the population size, similarly averaged. There 
are 10 Caribbean countries for which data on FDI and population is available in the five-year 
period, these observations have been circled. The figure appears to provide us with two initial 
suggestions. Firstly, if we follow Easterly and Kraay (2000) in letting 1 million inhabitants be 
the dividing line between small and large states, there does not appear to be any great 
difference between small and large states in their ability to attract foreign investment. 
Secondly, Caribbean states do not appear to be at a disadvantage in attracting FDI. In fact, 
most Caribbean states do better in terms of FDI inflows than countries comparable in size. 
And regardless of size, all the Caribbean states except Haiti have FDI inflows above the world 
average. 
 
 
Figure 1. FDI and population size 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
10000 100000 1000000 10000000 100000000 1000000000 10000000000
 
 
Easterly and Kraay (2000) suggest that the fact that small countries do not have lower growth 
rates than larger, is due to their greater openness, which offsets any negative factors. A similar 
explanation might be given for the apparent indifference of foreign direct investment to 
country size. Openness has been shown to be a highly robust determinant of FDI 
(Chakrabarti, 2001, Kolstad and Villanger, 2004a). Moreover, as suggested by Alesina 
(2003), small countries often have more homogeneous populations, which might increase 
stability, and reduce investment risk as perceived by investors. These factors might thus 
countervail any disadvantages of small states, such as a limited domestic market and other 
restrictions on the exploitation of economies of scale. As for the apparent attractiveness of 
Caribbean states to FDI, one explanation could be their proximity to major markets. 
 
The following figure provides a similar representation of domestic investment and population 
size for 156 countries. Gross domestic investment  as a percentage of GDP is measured on the 
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vertical axis, population on the horizontal, both averaged over the period 1998-2002. The 12 
Caribbean states for which relevant data was available, have been circled. In the case of 
domestic investment, an initial observation is that states with less than 1 million inhabitants 
do not seem to have different investment rates than larger states. This observation is thus 
similar to the one made about FDI and population size. However, in terms of domestic 
investment, Caribbean states do not appear to do better or worse than other states. Of the 12 
Caribbean states in the above figure, 7 have domestic investment rates above the world 
average. So there is no indication of a Caribbean-specific effect on domestic investment. 
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic investment and population size 
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The above figures are merely suggestive, and the conclusions that can be drawn from them 
are limited. To get a better idea of whether and how size and a Caribbean location influences 
foreign direct and domestic investment, more rigorous econometric techniques must be 
employed. And though small states do not appear different in terms of the investment they 
generate, they might differ in the mechanisms through which they attract investment. In what 
follows, we will attempt to ascertain whether policies to attract investment have a different 
impact in small countries than in large, and in Caribbean states than in other states. The next 
section provides further motivation for a study of investment in small states, by relating FDI 
and domestic investment to economic growth.. This is followed by an overview of the 
relevant literature on the most important aspects of the investment climate. In subsequent 
sections, we present the result from an econometric study, which estimates the impact of 
population size and a Caribbean location on investment determinants. 
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2. The crucial role of investment in increasing economic 
growth 
The standard theory of income growth takes labor, human and physical capital and technology 
as the main drivers of income changes. Thus, there exist a huge number of studies that assess 
the impact of these factors on economic growth. In recent times, there has been an increasing 
effort to complement the standard inputs of labor, capital and technology in the economic 
model with institutional factors. This has certainly been the case with macroeconomic growth 
models where rule of law, corruption, quality of governance, democracy and a range of other 
factors have been tested.  
 
Leaving out the complex discussions of the convergence issue, i.e. the economic growth that 
stems from a country catching up from a level below its steady state, we can conclude from 
the very thorough work of Barro et al. (2004) that there is a consensus that the following 
policy areas are important to growth. For given values of GDP per capita, economic growth 
increases in the amount of human capital, the investment ratio, the quality of the rule of law, 
the degree of the country’s openness to international markets. The factors that lead to reduced 
growth are high ratios of government consumption to GDP, high inflation rates and high 
fertility rates. Finally, it is found that favorable trends in terms of trade have a positive effect 
on growth. 
 
It is important to emphasize that investment is one of the most important sources of economic 
growth. This is confirmed both from the theoretical growth models which predict that 
increased investment will lead to a period of higher economic growth, and from the empirical 
testing of these models. Since economic growth is an important factor in development, we 
focus on foreign direct investments and gross domestic investment in this study.  
 
Based on the above theoretical underpinning and the empirical evidence, it is not very 
surprising that we find both FDI and domestic investment to be important determinants of 
economic growth in our sample. However, our data set does not contain enough information 
on the important human capital variables, and we also lack data on terms of trade. This lack of 
data discourages us from drawing broad conclusions from our growth regressions. However, 
our findings confirm the importance of the investment variables we use in this study, and their 
direct link to economic growth. We also find that the Caribbean countries have a lower 
growth on average after controlling for other factors. We tried to interact the Caribbean 
dummy with inflation, law, and trade to see if any of these areas could explain why the 
Caribbean countries lag behind with regards to growth rates. Neither of these variables were 
significant, so further research is warranted to explain this pattern. Table 1 gives an overview 
of our results in comparison to the stylized facts on the determinants of economic growth, 
while table A1 in the appendix gives the details. 
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Table 1. Summarizing the determinants of economic growth: The consensus in the literature and the 
results from our sample. + signifies a positive relationship, - signifies a negative relationship. 
 Barro et al. (2004) Our sample 
Convergence Yes Yes 
Human capital + +** 
Investment ratio 
-FDI 
-gross domestic investment 
+  
+ 
+ 
Rule of law + + 
International openness + * 
Government consumption  - Insignificant 
Inflation - - 
Fertility rate - n.a. 
Terms of trade + n.a. 
Population size Insignificant Insignificant 
Caribbean dummy n.a. - 
*We used the sum of export and import measured as the share of GDP. This turned up insignificant in a range of 
specifications, and also negative in some of these regressions. 
**Using the secondary school enrolment rate reduced our sample substantially. 
 
 
Confirming the importance of foreign direct investments and gross domestic investment in 
economic growth and thus development, we now proceed to investigate the determinants of 
these two measures of capital. 
3. A brief review of the investment literature 
FDI and domestic investment have been the subjects of a number of econometric studies, 
which typically focus on a limited number of variables, and which vary greatly in their 
specification, methodology, and data sample. Simply adding up the results from these studies 
would imply that there are a number of significant determinants of each type of investment. 
As the results from each study might be sensitive to the variables included, and the data 
sample used, individual studies focusing on a limited number of explanatory variables do not, 
however, give us an impression of which variables would be robust to alternative 
specifications and assumptions. A few studies have, however, tested for robustness by means 
of Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) due to Leamer (1983). The EBA approach basically 
entails running regressions featuring all feasible combinations of the explanatory variables, 
and deeming those variables robust whose coefficients are consistently significant and 
consistently signed. Since this approach provides us some idea of which variables matter 
regardless of specification, and thus narrow the set of potential investment determinants 
substantially, we start the review of the literature on each type of investment, by focusing on 
studies employing the EBA approach. To the extent that the EBA studies exclude certain 
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variables that might be of importance for our study, we then add studies that have done less in 
terms of robustness testing. The focus  is on public policy variables broadly conceived, 
including macroeconomic variables, infrastructure variables, and socio-political variables. 
3.1 Studies of FDI 
The only EBA analysis of aggregate FDI is due to Chakrabarti (2001).1 In this study, the 
robustness of a limited number of variables is tested, and only in a limited number of 
combinations. The analysis reveals that only GDP per capita passes the EBA test, and can 
therefore be deemed robust. Ranking the remaining variables by the average likelihood that 
their coefficients fall in the positive/negative area, openness (trade as a percentage of GDP) is 
deemed the variable most likely to be correlated with FDI, followed by wages, net exports, 
GDP growth, taxes, tariffs, and the real exchange rate. The importance of GDP per capita 
(normally interpreted as market size or maturity) suggests that poorer countries can gain from 
regional integration. The importance of openness, implies that trade policy can be used to 
influence FDI flows. Other policy areas, like tax and exchange rate regimes, appear relatively 
unimportant. Chakrabarti’s study does not directly address other macroeconomic variables, 
infrastructure, or socio-political variables, and we therefore turn to other available studies for 
evidence on these. 
 
As for macroeconomic policies, the most common explanatory variables included are 
inflation and exchange rates. The evidence on inflation largely suggest that it does not matter 
for FDI. Urata and Kawai (2001), Asiedu (2002), Harms (2002), and Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) largely find inflation to be insignificant. The results on exchange rates vary, Singh and 
Jun (1995) find FDI to be negatively associated with the real exchange rate, whereas Urata 
and Kawai (2001) do not find a consistently significant relationship. Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002) and Kucera (2002) find no significant relationship between exchange rate volatility 
and FDI. Some studies do, however, suggest that exchange rates might influence FDI in 
certain industries (McCorriston and Sheldon, 1998, Moshiran, 1997). 
 
A number of infrastructure variables have been tested as potential determinants of FDI, with 
mixed results. Biswas (2002) finds a positive relationship between telephones and electricity, 
and FDI. Harms (2002) finds a similar relationship for telephones. Choi (2003) estimates a 
significant relationship between the number of internet hosts and internet users and FDI 
inflows. On the other hand, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find neither telephones, 
electricity, nor internet connections significant for FDI.  
 
Several studies indicate that there is a relationship between FDI and broad indices of socio-
political instability and institutional quality. Using an aggregate of the six governance indices 
due to Kaufmann et al (1999a,b), Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find a significantly positive 
relation between governance and FDI. Similar relationships have been uncovered for 
composite ICRG indices (Harms, 2002, Biswas, 2002, Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), and for 
BERI indices (Singh and Jun, 1995).2 On the whole, socio-political factors do seem related to 
FDI. Studies using more disaggregate indices suggest that FDI is particularly influenced by 
corruption (Wei, 2000, Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) and internal conflict (Tuman and 
Emmert, 1999, Kolstad and Tøndel, 2002). Some studies find a positive relationship between 
political freedom and FDI (Harms and Ursprung, 2002, Kolstad and Tøndel, 2002, Kolstad 
and Villanger, 2004a), others find no significant relation between the two (Singh and Jun, 
                                                 
1 For a study of service sector FDI employing EBA techniques, see Kolstad and Villanger (2004c). 
2 ICRG = International Country Risk Guide , BERI = Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
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1995, Noorbakhsh et al, 2001). Similarly, some studies find human capital formation 
important for FDI (Noorbakhsh et al, 2001, Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, Harms and 
Ursprung, 2002), wheras others do not (Wei, 2000, Kolstad and Tøndel, 2002). 
 
In sum, the major policy variables for countries seeking to increase FDI inflows, appear to be 
regional integration (at least for poorer countries), trade openness, and socio-political 
governance with an emphasis on corruption, internal conflict, and possibly political freedom 
and human capital formation. As for macroeconomic governance and infrastructure 
development, available studies offer no clear conclusions. 
3.2 Studies of domestic investment 
Levine and Renelt (1992) perform an EBA analysis of domestic investment rates. A main 
result is that only two variables are robust to perturbations of the specification. Trade 
openness is consistently positively related to domestic investment. In addition, the number of 
revolutions and coups, has a negative relation to domestic investment. A number of other 
variables are not robust determinants of investment, these include initial GDP per capita, 
population growth, inflation, government consumption/expenditure/deficit, exchange-rate 
distortions, domestic credit growth, and secondary school enrolment. The study thus suggests 
that trade policy and political stability are vital for domestic investment, whereas the impact 
of a variety of macroeconomic policies is dubious, as is human capital formation. 
 
Several other studies confirm the relationship between political instability and domestic 
investment (Brunetti and Weder, 1998, Bohn and Deacon, 2000). In addition, some studies 
suggest that institutional quality variables in the form of property rights and corruption affect 
investment (Knack and Keefer, 1995, Mauro, 1995, Campos et al, 1999). Studies exploring 
more complex relationships suggest that there is a link from inequality to instability, from 
instability to the security of property rights, and from property rights to investment (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996, and Svensson, 1998). Various indices of democracy seem to be related to 
domestic investment (Bohn and Deacon, 2000, Pastor and Hilt, 1993), whereas political 
freedom does not seem important in itself (Ghura and Goodwin, 2000, Mlambo and 
Oshikoya, 2001). Knack and Keefer (1997) find a significant association between social 
capital and investment. 
 
As noted by Reinikka and Svensson (2002), “the role of poor infrastructure .. has received 
relatively little attention in the economic literature”. Some studies do find a significant effect 
of infrastructure on growth, however. Easterly and Levine (1997) find a positive relationship 
between the number of telephones per worker and growth, but see no impact of roads or 
electricity supply. However, in a study of microenterprises, Reinikka and Svensson (2002) 
find a significant relation between power provision and investment. 
 
In sum, trade integration appears an important policy variable for domestic investment, as it 
was for FDI. Moreover, political stability appears conducive to domestic investment, as do 
clear property rights and limited corruption. Though there does seem to be a relation between 
democracy and domestic investment, it is not an entirely clear one. Available evidence 
suggests that macroeconomic policies do not have a substantial effect on domestic investment, 
nor do policies to promote human capital formation. The role of infrastructure development 
on domestic investment, must be explored further. 
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4. The determinants of foreign direct investment: Is the 
Caribbean different? 
We conducted an econometric study of the determinants of FDI flows, based on panel data for 
135 countries over the period 1980-2002. Our core sample consists of 2270 observations, 
where 182 of these are observations from 13 Caribbean countries during the panel period. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of net FDI inflows to GDP, which is a standard measure in the 
FDI literature (Asiedu 2002). First, we discuss the general mechanisms that seem to attract 
FDI to an average country. Then we proceed to investigate whether there are certain policies 
that would work differently in a Caribbean country compared to other countries. 
4.1 General results 
Since some of the previous studies of FDI suggest that areas with high economic growth 
attract more FDI, we include this variable to control for the pattern that investors seek towards 
areas that prosper in terms of economic activity. Similarly, FDI tend to be positively related to 
the GDP of a country, which reflects the FDI that aims towards producing for the host country 
market. i.e. market-seeking FDI. We therefore tested different measures of how rich a country 
is in order to control for this effect, both GDP, GDP per capita and GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity and their logged values. All of these six measures are very unstable 
in our regressions, so we conclude in line with the existing literature that the size of the 
market is most likely positively related to FDI flows. 
 
We tested a range of different governance policy variables that may be important for FDI. Our 
data provided us with detailed information on inflation, the total amount of debt (in percent of 
exports), trade, the percentage of the population living in urban areas and the size of the 
population. Since the quality of infrastructure may affect the investor’s decision of where to 
invest, we also included a variable to proxy for infrastructure. Unfortunately, we lacked 
sufficient data for the best proxies for infrastructure important to investors, like kilometers of 
paved roads and railways. We did have information on telephone mainlines, but earlier 
research has pointed to the insufficiency of this measure as a proxy for infrastructure (Kolstad 
and Villanger 2004a). The proxy for which we have data is mobile phones, which turns up 
highly significant and positively related to FDI.  
 
Based on the data availability of these variables, we used the above variables to construct two 
base specifications, one including total amount of debt (1668 observations) and one excluding 
this variable (2270 observations). The reason for operating with two samples is simply that we 
wanted to test how the amount of debt influences FDI. This, in turn, reduced the number of 
observations on the Caribbean countries making it more difficult to draw inference from the 
results for these countries. Initially, we started to investigate whether the higher inflow of FDI 
to Caribbean countries noted above would survive once we control for the factors that are 
supposed to affect FDI flows. As can be seen from the significance of the Caribbean dummy 
in table 2, model 1, we find that these countries attract more FDI than other, similar countries. 
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Table 2. Regression results. OLS regressions with logarithmic FDI/GDP as dependent variable. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Growth 0.037*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
Inflation  
(logged) 
-0.064*** 
(0.026) 
-0.060** 
(0.026) 
Population size 
(logged) 
-0.031** 
(0.024) 
-0.032** 
(0.024) 
Mobil 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Urban 
(% of population) 
0.020*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.002) 
GDP per capita 
(logged. PPP) 
-0.185* 
(0.065) 
-0.183* 
(0.065) 
Trade 0.016*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
Total Debt  
(% of Export) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Caribbean 0.398*** 
(0.126)  
Inflation* 
Caribbean 
 
-0.036* 
(0.074) 
Trade* 
Caribbean  
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
   
Constant 0.157 
(0.624) 
0.188 
(0.622) 
Observations 1668 1668 
2R  0.31 0.31 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
Note that total debt is found to discourage FDI flows, a finding that is significant in both 
models. This result is sustained in virtually all models we tested, and is also as expected from 
a theoretical point of view. It is straightforward to visualize how a country’s debt burden may 
influence the foreign investors’ perception of the attractiveness of channeling FDI to that 
country. Large debt burdens are to be repaid in the future, and one risk as seen from the 
investor’s point of view, is an increase in taxes. Thus, a standard prediction would typically 
be that large debt burdens would, ceteris paribus, reduce the inflows of FDI to a country. 
 
We also find that the larger trade as a share of GDP, the larger the inflow of FDI. This may be 
a result of the nature of some of the foreign direct investments. If the purpose of this 
investment is to produce for foreign markets, i.e. markets outside the country that hosts the 
FDI, then the investors will prefer countries that have less trade restrictions. These countries 
will also tend to have a higher share of trade to GDP. Further, we find that inflation is 
negatively related to inflows of FDI. Thus, high levels of inflation discourage investors. One 
caveat should be noted with respect to this result. There has been a debate on how inflation 
may have negative impacts on the economy, and it seems to emerge a consensus that only 
very high rates of inflation discourage investments. Thus, moderate or small levels of 
increases in price levels would probably not have negative impacts on the economy. Our 
results on inflation should be seen in this light, so the policy recommendation should be that 
governments should avoid high rates of inflation.  
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Note also the peculiar result that the larger the population size, the less inflows of FDI. 
However, this coefficient becomes insignificant once we add further explanatory variables.3 
Thus, our conclusion with regards to population size is that it does not matter to inflows of 
foreign direct investments, as indicated by figure 1. Finally, we found that the larger the share 
of the population living in urban areas, the larger the inflows of FDI. This result probably 
reflects the fact that a large share of the major economic activity, including the FDI, is 
situated in urban areas. Finally, we also tested life expectancy as a proxy for human capital. 
This reduced our sample substantially, down to 1200 observations, and it turned up 
insignificant in explaining FDI flows in this sub-sample. 
4.2 Results and policies for Caribbean countries  
One important question is to find out why these countries are better at attracting FDI than 
others, so that the policy makers can use this advantage to spur economic growth. We started 
out by testing whether the share of trade in percent of GDP had any particular impact of FDI 
for these countries. As can be seen from the interaction term between trade and the Caribbean 
dummy in table 2, model 2, it seems initially that trade openness is more important in 
attracting FDI in Caribbean countries compared to other countries. We computed interaction 
terms between the Caribbean dummy and all the other policy-relevant explanatory variables 
in the base specification, but only the trade-Caribbean interaction term and the Caribbean-
inflation interaction-term remained significant. However, other explanations need to be 
checked before any conclusions are drawn. 
 
The next step was to test the KKZ governance indices documented in Kaufman, Kray and 
Mastruzzi (2003). These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables 
measuring perceptions of governance collected in four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2002. The information base is constructed from 25 separate data sources from 18 different 
organizations. These indices measure governance along the following six dimensions:  
 
Voice and accountability: Focuses on the political process, civil liberties and political rights. 
Captures the extent to which citizens of a country take part in the decision process that leads 
to the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the 
independence of the media. Thus, we get in indicator of the quality of the monitoring of those 
in authority, and the degree to which the governors are held accountable for their actions. 
 
Political instability and absence of violence: Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
 
Rule of law: Includes indicators of whether the inhabitants abide by the law, and whether they 
have confidence in the judicial system. Different measures of perceptions of the incidence of 
crime are included, as well as whether people believe the judiciary is effective and 
predictable, and the degree to which contracts can be enforced. 
 
Government effectiveness: Measures responses on the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
policies. 
 
                                                 
3 See tables 2 and table 3 below. 
  11 
Controlling corruption: Indicates perceptions of corruption, which is defined as the exercise 
of public power for private gain. Note, however, that the different aspect of corruption 
measured by the various sources differs somewhat. They range from the frequency of 
“additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of corruption on the business 
environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite 
forms to engage in “state capture”. 
 
Regulatory quality: Focuses on the policies themselves. It includes measures of the incidence 
of market-unfriendly policies like price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and 
business development. 
 
We take the average of four years as a proxy for each of the governance dimensions in the 
particular countries during the full sample period 1980-2002. 
 
Our methodological approach takes the standard form found in the literature, but in addition 
to this, we also elaborate on the robustness of the estimates. Inspired by Levine and Renelt 
(1992), we test all feasible combinations of the policy variables in hand.4  First, each of the 
KKZ variables were added individually to the base specification to see whether they picked 
up some of the variation. Second, we entered them in every feasible pair-wise combination, 
and then third, all combinations of three of the KKZ variables were tested. Fourth, we 
investigated all combinations of four of the variables, and finally, all five variables were 
included in the specification. The specification that emerges as robust by this procedure is 
given in table 3 for the sample where total debt is included as an explanatory variable. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that our approach is not a complete extreme bounds test. First, we tested the robustness of the variables in 
our base specification by combining them in different econometric specifications. Second, we took this base 
specification as given and investigated how the sign and significance of the remaining policy variables changed 
in different models.  
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Table 3. Regression results. OLS regressions with logarithmic FDI/GDP as dependent variable. 
 Model 3 
Growth 0.042*** 
0.007 
Inflation (logged) -0.057** 
0.026 
Population 0.019 
0.025 
Mobil 0.001*** 
0.001 
Urban 0.018*** 
0.003 
GDP per capita (PPP) -0.223*** 
0.072 
Trade 0.018*** 
0.001 
Total Debt (% of exports) -0.013*** 
0.003 
Trade*Caribbean 0.003*** 
0.001 
Law -0.930*** 
0.111 
Regulatory quality 0.965*** 
0.092 
Stability 0.154*** 
0.072 
Constant -0.509*** 
0.672 
Observations 1583 
2R  0.34 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
However, in order to get more observations on the Caribbean countries, we excluded total 
debt and thus used the 2270 observation sample when exploring the interaction effects. The 
main results, emerging from the same procedure as explained for the 1668 sample, are given 
in table 4 below. The indices that enter significant in both samples are law, regulatory quality 
and stability. Note that the coefficient of the law index is negative, a result that may seem 
puzzling since FDI requires a certain juridical framework, like, for example, a bankruptcy act. 
However, after inquiring into this pattern, we find that the negative coefficient is most likely a 
result of multicolinearity. This implies that we are not able to provide firm conclusions on the 
impact of law on FDI from our results. The sign of the regulatory quality index and the 
stability index are as expected, both are positively related to inflows of FDI.  
 
We also tested the ICRG index, which includes a wide range of measures of political risk like 
internal and external conflict, the stability of the government, the degree of military 
interference in politics, ethnic, religious and tensions. We found this index to be positively 
related to FDI. Again, there was no sign of any specific pattern for Caribbean countries and 
the policy recommendation is thus the same for these countries as for all others trying to 
attract FDI: Reducing political risk will probably increase the inflows of FDI. The ICRG 
results are reported in table A4 in the appendix.  
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Several other policy-variables of interest were also tested. We found that three different 
measures of government expenditures were insignificant in explaining FDI flows, whether 
this variable was measured as the share of GDP, in current local currency, or in current local 
currency logged.5 The overall budget balance seems to have some impact, but is only 
significant at the 10 percent level. Moreover, we also lacked quite some data for this variable, 
so we were only able to check it when leaving other important explanatory variables out. 
Including total debt as an explanatory variable implies that the budget balance variable loses 
its significance, but this seems to be a result of reducing the sample from 1607 observations to 
1145 observations.6  Using the ICRG reduces the number of observations on the Caribbean 
countries from 182 to 70, which in itself should affect the significance of the Caribbean 
interaction terms. 
 
Table 4. Regression results. OLS regressions with logarithmic FDI/GDP as dependent variable. 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Growth 0.037*** 
(0.006) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
Inflation -0.051** 
(0.022) 
-0.050** 
(0.022) 
-0.045** 
(0.022) 
Population 0.014 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
0.029 
(0.022) 
Mobil 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
GDP per capita (logged, 
PPP) 
-0.231*** 
(0.062) 
-0.212*** 
(0.062) 
-0.216*** 
(0.062) 
Trade 0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Trade*Caribbean 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Law -0.868*** 
(0.083) 
-0.883*** 
(0.083) 
-0.888*** 
(0.083) 
Regulatory quality 0.977*** 
(0.081) 
0.972*** 
(0.080) 
0.997*** 
(0.081) 
Stability 0.168*** 
(0.062) 
0.170*** 
(0.062) 
0.162*** 
(0.062) 
Stability*Caribbean  
 
0.670*** 
(0.249) 
1.184*** 
(0.363) 
Regulation*Caribbean  
 
 
 
-0.639** 
(0.329) 
Constant -0.433 
(0.565) 
-0.691 
(0.573) 
-0.794 
(0.575) 
Observations 2178 2178 2178 
2R  0.32 0.32 0.32 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
                                                 
5 See table A2, model 9, for one of the tested specifications. 
6 To test this, we ran model 8 on the 1145 observations-sample for which we have data on total debt. The result 
was that the overall budget balance variable was insignificant on this reduced sample, so the insignificance of 
this variable in model 9 is probably not a result of the inclusion of total debt variable, but a result of the change 
in sample. 
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When there are as few observations as we have on the Caribbean interaction terms, it is 
necessary to investigate whether there are particular pattern with some of the countries that 
explain these results, or whether these are findings representative for the Caribbean countries. 
The initial test was to exclude one of the 12 Caribbean countries, and then re-run model 6 on 
this sample. This test was performed for each of the 12 countries, and two interesting results 
emerged. First, none of the variables were changed significantly in any of these 12 
regressions, except for the Caribbean-regulatory- index interaction term. This interaction term 
became insignificant in four of the regressions, namely when the Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica or 
Grenada were excluded. 
 
The fact that a few observations drive the regulatory-result implies that we cannot generalize 
from the significant coefficient from the full sample regressions. What we can say, however, 
is that policy makers interested in increasing FDI to the Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica or Grenada 
should look further into this relationship in order to find the reason for this pattern. Moreover, 
if these countries were able to improve their regulatory framework so as to achieve a similar 
relationship between regulatory quality and FDI as an average country, then this would 
approximately lead to a tripling of the impact of improving the regulatory framework in these 
countries.7 
 
The second-stage test was to exclude pairs of Caribbean countries to investigate whether two 
countries together may drive the results. Thus, all combinations of two countries were 
excluded and model 3 was run for each alternative sample. In addition to the obvious result 
that the four countries discussed above affects the significance of the Caribbean-regulatory-
index interaction term in a similar pattern in this test, we find that the Caribbean-stability-
index is affected by two country-pairs. This interaction term becomes insignificant if we 
exclude Haiti and Guyana, and also if Dominica and Grenada are jointly excluded. 
 
Again, these findings imply that there is an extra effect of improving stability in Haiti, 
Guyana, Dominica and Grenada. Moreover, our estimates suggest that improving stability in 
these countries will have a tenfold increase in inflows of FDI compared to an average country. 
This may indicate that foreign investors will withdraw from countries that become unstable, 
but also that FDI may increase substantially in countries that go from severe instabilities and 
into a more stable state. We would probably get a more thorough understanding of this 
relationship by scrutinizing the track-record of FDI and stability of these four countries. 
5. Domestic investment in small Caribbean states 
To test whether smallness or a Caribbean location has any implications for domestic 
investment, we proceed in two steps. The first step consists of adding population size and a 
Caribbean dummy to a basic set of explanatory variables. This tells us whether smallness or a 
Caribbean location, constitute an advantage or disadvantage in and of itself. In the second 
step, we interact the population variable and the Caribbean dummy with other policy variables 
that affect investment. The results indicate whether investment in small or Caribbean 
countries is affected differently by the variables in question, as compared to other countries. 
In other words, the use of interaction variables tells us whether there is reason to give 
different policy advice to small or Caribbean countries, that that given to other countries. 
                                                 
7 The true net impact is, of course, difficult to predict. Our suggestion is based on the difference between the 
coefficient of the Caribbean-regulatory-index interaction term when before and after omitting the countries that 
drives the result. The true difference is probably mu ch higher since the lack of such a relationship for the other 
Caribbean countries attenuates this coefficient. 
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As our dependent variable, we use gross domestic investment in per cent of GDP, 1980-2002. 
To avoid limiting our data sample excessively, we have had to restrict our choice of 
explanatory variables. We include trade (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP), and 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted and logged), to test for the effects of trade and regional 
integration on domestic investment. We use inflation (logged) to test the effect of 
macroeconomic policies on investment. There are two infrastructure variables available to us 
with an adequate number of observations, mobile phones per 1000 people, and telephone 
mainlines per 1000 people. We include all six KKZ indices measuring voice, stability, 
effectiveness, regulation, rule of law, and corruption. Since observations for these indices are 
only available for selected years, we use the average of these. Finally, we include population 
size to capture the effect of smallness, and a Caribbean dummy. Restricting the data sample 
according to these variables, leaves us with in excess of 2500 observations, from 145 
countries, 10 of which are Caribbean. 
 
Using the Extreme Bounds Analysis approach, we ran OLS regressions featuring all 
combinations of our explanatory variables (though never more than one infrastructure variable 
or one KKZ index at a time). As it turns out, four variables are consistently significant and 
consistent in sign across all regressions in which they are included (see table 5). Domestic 
investment is higher in countries that trade more, that have higher GDP per capita levels, that 
are politically stable, and that have a greater population. Though our results establish 
correlation, and not causation, they at least suggest that pursuing trade and regional 
integration, and creating a stable environment, are relevant policy measures for any country 
seeking to boost investment. In addition, small countries are at a disadvantage in generating 
domestic investment, which makes performance on the other dimensions more important for 
these countries. More rigorous techniques thus reveal a correlation between population size 
and investment, which a casual inspection of figure 2 did not uncover. 
 
We do not, however, find that Caribbean countries are different from other countries. As 
regression DI2 in table 5 shows, the Caribbean dummy is insignificant. Further analyses 
reveal that the Caribbean dummy is significant and positive in some combinations with other 
explanatory variables, but becomes insignificant whenever trade is added to the estimated 
equation. This suggests that if Caribbean countries do get more domestic investment than 
other countries, this is mainly due to greater trade flows. As for our other explanatory 
variables, neither inflation, nor the two infrastructure variables, nor the other KKZ indices, are 
consistently significant across specifications.  
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Table 5. Regression results. Dependent variable: Gross domestic investment/GDP (logged) 
 DI1 DI2 DI3 
Trade 
0.056*** 
(0.003) 
0.056*** 
(0.003) 
0.065*** 
(0.004) 
GDP/cap 
0.478*** 
(0.164) 
0.480*** 
(0.164) 
0.198 
(0.214) 
Stability 
0.675*** 
(0.206) 
0.674*** 
(0.206) 
0.641** 
(0.251) 
Population 
1.18E-08*** 
(1.09E-09) 
1.18E-08*** 
(1.09E-09) 
1.20E-08*** 
(1.20E-09) 
Caribbean  
0.281  
(0.515) 
 
TaxRev/GDP   
0.047*** 
(0.017) 
Constant 
13.255*** 
(1.39) 
13.239*** 
(1.391) 
14.358*** 
(1.800) 
Obs 2584 2584 1935 
Adj R2 0.1648 0.1646 0.1959 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
For smaller data samples, we also tested the impact of literacy and school enrolment, which 
proved insignificant. The same is true for total debts as a percentage of GNI, government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and the government budget balance. An attempt to 
include life expectancy, proved it to be highly correlated with GDP/capita, leading to 
problems of multicollinearity. As shown in column DI3, the revenue side of government does, 
however, appear to be linked to investment. We find a positive and significant relationship 
between tax revenues/GDP and investment, a relationship that is robust to the inclusion or 
exclusion of the other variables used above.8 This result might indicate that an increase in 
public investment that follows from increased taxes, is greater than the decrease in private 
investment. However, if taxation is redistributive, the arguments of Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
suggest that the impact on private investment might even be positive. Note that the inclusion 
of tax revenues makes GDP per capita insignificant, which is partly due to the change in the 
sample. 
 
To test whether the determinants of domestic investment, have a differential impact on 
investment if countries are small or Caribbean, we interacted population size and the 
Caribbean dummy with each of the three variables trade, GDP/capita, and stability. The 
results from adding these interaction variables to a base specification, is captured by table 6. 
As it turns out, several of these interaction variables are significant. More populous countries 
appear to see a greater effect of trade, GDP/capita, and stability, on investment (columns DI4-
6 in table 6). However, a major problem in using interaction variables, is that they often have 
a high degree of correlation with the variables from which they are constructed, resulting in 
multincollinearity issues. Indeed, the interaction terms of popula tion and trade, and of 
population and GDP/capita, have more than a 90% correlation with the population variable. A 
similar problem arises for the only significant interaction term constructured from the 
Caribbean dummy (column DI8 in table 6). The interaction between the dummy and 
GDP/capita, is almost perfectly correlated with the Caribbean dummy. This leaves us with 
                                                 
8 There is not necessarily a contradiction between this result and the negative correlation of government 
expenditure and growth in table 1. The two variables in question are far from perfectly correlated in our sample. 
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only the interaction between population size and stability, which is not highly correlated with 
any individual variable. However, the significance of this interaction term is not robust to 
changes in the specification. For a smaller sample, we also tested the interaction of tax 
revenues, and population and the Caribbean dummy, none of which were significant. We thus 
cannot conclude that small or Caribbean countries are different in terms of the impact of the 
major investment determinants. 
 
Table 6. Regression results, interacted variables. Dep. variable: Gross domestic investment/GDP (logged) 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
 
To sum up, trade openness, integration with richer countries, and political stability appear to 
be the major policy implications for a country seeking to boost investment. This is largely in 
line with the findings of previous studies. There might also be a positive effect of tax 
revenues, but further study is needed to determine how this relationship works, before policy 
implication can be drawn. Smaller countries appear to be at a disadvantage in generating 
investment domestically, which makes pursuing the right kinds of policies all the more 
important. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that Caribbean countries generate 
more or less investment than other countries. Nor can we conclude from our analysis that 
small or Caribbean economies react differently to investment stimuli than other economies. In 
terms of generating domestic investment, small and Caribbean countries should receive the 
same policy advice as other countries. 
 
 DI4 DI5 DI6 DI7 DI8 DI9 
Trade 
0.054*** 
(0.003) 
0.058*** 
(0.003) 
0.058*** 
(0.003) 
0.056*** 
(0.003) 
0.057*** 
(0.003) 
0.056*** 
(0.003) 
GDP/cap 
0.436*** 
(0.164) 
0.359** 
(0.177) 
0.453*** 
(0.164) 
0.48*** 
(0.164) 
0.544*** 
(0.164) 
0.479*** 
(0.164) 
Stability 
0.763*** 
(0.206) 
0.69*** 
(0.206) 
0.475** 
(0.214) 
0.674*** 
(0.206) 
0.678*** 
(0.205) 
0.677*** 
(0.207) 
Population 1.4E-09 
(2.56E-09) 
1.23E-08 
(1.34E-08) 
1.26E-08*** 
(1.12E-09) 
1.18E-08*** 
(1.09E-09) 
1.19E-08*** 
(1.09E-09) 
1.18E-08*** 
(1.09E-09) 
Caribbean    
0.089 
(1.408) 
33.097*** 
(7.229) 
0.324 
(0.568) 
Popul*Trade 3.4E-10*** 
(7.57E-11) 
     
Popul*GDP/cap  3.14E-09* 
(1.74E-09) 
    
Popul*Stabil   7.47E-09*** 
(2.25E-09) 
   
Carib*Trade    
0.002 
(0.014)   
Carib*GDP/cap     -3.884*** 
(0.853) 
 
Carib*Stabil      -0.177 
(0.985) 
Constant 
13.646*** 
(1.388) 
14.082*** 
(1.463) 
13.394*** 
(1.388) 
13.246*** 
(1.392) 
12.64*** 
(1.392) 
13.236*** 
(1.391) 
Obs 2584 2584 2584 2584 2584 2584 
Adj R2 0.171 0.1656 0.1681 0.1643 0.171 0.1643 
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6. A summary of policy implications 
In the light of past studies, the preceding results provide the following policy advice to 
Caribbean policy makers seeking to increase investment in, and hence the growth 
prospectives of, their countries. 
 
1. Investment, both foreign and domestic, is higher in countries that are open to international 
trade. Our results also suggest that Caribbean countries might see a greater effect of trade 
integration than other countries. Caribbean governments should therefore pursue regional 
trade arrangements, and actively support the WTO process of global trade liberalization. 
 
2. Investment, both foreign and domestic, is higher in countries whose domestic markets are 
larger and more advanced. Regional integration to expand what is considered the domestic 
market, is thus beneficial. 
 
3. Investment, both foreign and domestic, is higher in countries with greater political stability. 
To inspire confidence among investors, Caribbean countries should avoid major political 
disruptions, by pursuing inclusive and participatory policies. Our results suggest that 
investment is particularly responsive to stability issues in countries like Haiti, Guyana, 
Dominica, and Grenada. 
 
4. Foreign investors are discouraged by bad macro-economic policies, poor infrastructure, and 
excessive regulation. Caribbean countries should avoid periods of high inflation and large 
debt burdens, and develop functional infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. 
 
This general advice is based on analyses of the factors that move total investment flows. As 
noted earlier, investment in specific industries can be driven by different factors. Given the 
fact that FDI in the service industries accounts for more than 60% of total FDI flows, focusing 
on these industries is particularly relevant.  
 
Kolstad and Villanger (2004c) conduct an analysis of the factors that determine FDI in 
services as a whole, and in four individual service industries (finance, business, transport, and 
trade). A major results is that while domestic market size influences FDI in services as a 
whole, and in each of the four industries, trade openness is insignificant across the board. For 
a country seeking to attract FDI in services, the implication would be that less of an emphasis 
on trade integration is needed, than the above general advice would indicate. The study 
further finds that FDI in certain producer service industries (finance and transport) depends on 
there being a foreign manufacturing base in the host country. Finally, though socio-political 
variables do not influence FDI as a whole, the institutional environment affects investment in 
certain sectors, particularly transport. Other service industries important for Caribbean 
countries, such as tourism and health services, are not analysed by the study. More research is 
therefore needed to determine how Caribbean countries can promote an expansion of these 
industries. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A 1. Regression results. OLS regressions with economic growth as dependent variable 
Growth Regression 1 Regression 2 
GDP per capita 
-0,0004*** 
(0,000) 
-0,0004*** 
(0,000) 
FDI/GDP 
0,346*** 
(0,084) 
0,262*** 
(0,099) 
Law 
1,157*** 
(0,271) 
1,262*** 
(0,303) 
Trade 
-0,020*** 
(0,004) 
-0,021*** 
(0,005) 
Inflation (logged) 
-0,751*** 
(0,088) 
-0,680*** 
(0,107) 
Gross domestic investment 
0,134*** 
(0,017) 
0,145*** 
(0,020) 
Caribbean 
-1,066*** 
(0,421) 
-1,577*** 
(0,503) 
Government expenditures 
(logged) 
0,061** 
(0,032) 
-0,015 
(0,036) 
Total Debt (% of export) 
-0,021** 
(0,010) 
-0,019* 
(0,012) 
Budget balance 
 
 
0,180*** 
(0,033) 
Constant 
3,587*** 
(1,006) 
5,653 
(1,183) 
Observations 1638 1201 
2R  0.12 0.14 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
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Table A 2. Regression results. OLS regressions with logarithmic FDI/GDP as dependent variable 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Growth 0,027*** 
(0,007) 
0,034*** 
(0,008) 
0,035*** 
(0,008) 
Inflation (logged) -0,072*** 
(0,027) 
-0,118*** 
(0,032) 
-0,125*** 
(0,032) 
Mobil 0,003*** 
(0,000) 
0,002** 
(0,001) 
0,002** 
(0,001) 
Urban 0,011*** 
(0,002) 
0,014*** 
(0,003) 
0,014*** 
(0,003) 
GDP per capita (logged, 
PPP) 
-0,036 
(0,077) 
0,052 
(0,092) 
0,037 
(0,093) 
Trade 0,018*** 
(0,001) 
0,019*** 
(0,001) 
0,019*** 
(0,001) 
Trade*Caribbean 0,003 
(0,002) 
0,004* 
(0,002) 
0,004* 
(0,002) 
Law -0,852*** 
(0,095) 
-0,727*** 
(0,132) 
-0,755*** 
(0,134) 
Regulation 1,012*** 
(0,093) 
0,889*** 
(0,109) 
0,916*** 
(0,110) 
Stability -0,030 
(0,074) 
-0,086 
(0,088) 
-0,073 
(0,090) 
Stability *Caribbean 2,376*** 
(0,746) 
1,889*** 
(0,774) 
1,916*** 
(0,776) 
Regulation*Caribbean -1,849*** 
(0,616) 
-1,271** 
(0,646) 
-1,318** 
(0,650) 
Overall budget balance 
(incl. grants) 
0,014* 
(0,008) 
-0,001 
(0,010) 
-0,003 
(0,010) 
Total debt (% of export)  
 
-0,008** 
(0,003) 
-0,008*** 
(0,003) 
Government expenditures 
(current currency, logged) 
 
 
 
 
0,013 
(0,011) 
Constant -1,671*** 
(0,567) 
-2,315*** 
(0,672) 
-2,505 
(0,722) 
Observations 
   # Caribbean obs. 
1607 
111 
1145 
105 
1136 
105 
2R  0.33 0.37 0.38 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
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Table A 3. Regression results. OLS regressions with logarithmic FDI/GDP as dependent variable. Using 
country average of ICRG 
 Model 11 
Growth 0,039*** 
(0,009) 
Inflation (logged) -0,113*** 
(0,034) 
Mobil 0,002** 
(0,001) 
Urban 0,014*** 
(0,003) 
GDP per capita (logged, 
PPP) 
-0,077 
(0,114) 
Trade 0,018*** 
(0,002) 
Trade*Caribbean 0,013 
(0,010) 
Law -0,665*** 
(0,139) 
Regulation 0,922*** 
(0,114) 
Stability -0,114 
(0,107) 
Stability *Caribbean 6,661 
(6,266) 
Regulation*Caribbean -5,296 
(4,927) 
Overall budget balance 
(incl. Grants) 
-0,015 
(0,010) 
Total debt (% of export) -0,007** 
(0,003) 
Government expenditures 
(current currency, logged) 
0,015 
(0,011) 
ICRG (country average) 0,020* 
(0,012) 
Constant -2,886*** 
(0,802) 
 Observations 
   # Caribbean obs. 
1005 
61 
R 0.36 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
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Table A 4. Descriptive statistics, FDI regressions 
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI/GDP (logged) 2270 0.115 1.549 -7.634 6.427 
Growth 2270 3.223 4.636 -34.859 38.855 
Inflation (logged) 2270 2.081 1.415 -4.191 9.372 
Population (logged) 2270 15.911 1.855 10.621 20.964 
Total debt (% of exports) 1668 18.691 13.940 0.018 117.808 
Mobil 2270 50.704 142.819 0.000 1060.538 
Urban 2270 51.370 22.866 4.34 100 
GDP per capita (logged. PPP) 2270 8.338 1.068 6.037 10.900 
Trade 2270 72.756 37.342 6.320 272.445 
Stability 2178 0.100 0.870 -2.240 1.64 
Regulation 2270 0.227 0.766 -1.830 1.688 
Law 2270 0.157 0.958 -1.435 2.165 
Effectiveness 2270 0.139 0.928 -1.385 2.23 
Voice 2270 0.194 0.891 -1.685 1.613 
Corruption 2270 0.138 1.001 -1.148 2.39 
Stability*Caribbean 2178 0.011 0.127 -0.903 0.653 
Regulation*Caribbean 2270 0.009 0.128 -1.050 0.998 
Law*Caribbean 2270 -0.002 0.142 -1.353 1.048 
Effectiveness*Caribbean 2270 -0.019 0.149 -1.353 0.953 
Voice*Caribbean 2270 0.056 0.245 -0.748 1.185 
Corruption*Caribbean 2270 -0.006 0.122 -1.123 0.813 
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Table A 5. Correlation matrix for the 2178 observations sample used in table 4 
FDI/ 
GDP 
Growth Inflation 
(logged) 
Population 
(logged) 
Mobil Urban GDP per 
capita 
(logged, 
PPP) 
    
FDI/GDP 1.00     
Growth 0.12 1.00    
Inflation 
(logged) 
-0.12 -0.21 1.00   
Population 
(logged) 
-0.25 -0.01 0.12 1.00   
Mobil 0.22 -0.02 -0.27 -0.01 1.00  
Urban 0.15 -0.12 -0.10 0.02 0.32 1.00 
GDP per capita 
(logged, PPP) 
0.12 -0.05 -0.25 -0.01 0.42 0.81 1.00
Trade 0.45 0.05 -0.12 -0.55 0.14 0.05 0.12
Law 0.08 0.01 -0.35 -0.03 0.37 0.63 0.83
Regulation 0.17 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.35 0.65 0.79
Stability 0.17 0.00 -0.29 -0.21 0.31 0.54 0.69
Stability* 
Caribbean 
0.16 0.03 -0.11 -0.31 -0.01 0.10 0.06
Regulation* 
Caribbean 
0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.11 0.08
    
Trade Law Regulation Stability Stability* 
Caribbean 
Regulation* 
Caribbean 
    
Trade 1.00     
Law 0.11 1.00    
Regulation 0.06 0.89 1.00   
Stability 0.26 0.84 0.76 1.00   
Stability* 
Caribbean 
0.17 0.10 0.10 0.14 1.00  
Regulation* 
Caribbean 
0.12 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.74 1.00 
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Table A 6. Correlation matrix for the 1668 observations sample used in tables 2 and 3 
FDI/GDP Growth Inflation 
(logged) 
Population 
(logged) 
Mobil 
phones 
Urban GDP per 
capita 
(logged, 
PPP 
FDI/GDP 1.00    
Growth 0.13 1.00   
Inflation -0.14 -0.24 1.00  
Population -0.28 0.02 0.21 1.00  
Mobil 0.22 -0.01 -0.19 -0.01 1.00 
Urban 0.23 -0.13 0.13 -0.04 0.28 1.00
GDP per 
capita 
(logged, 
PPP) 
0.22 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 0.34 0.74 1.00
Trade 0.47 0.04 -0.16 -0.55 0.23 0.07 0.23
Law 0.17 0.10 -0.17 -0.19 0.23 0.36 0.57
Regulation 0.25 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.26 0.46 0.56
Stability 0.28 0.04 -0.14 -0.38 0.20 0.34 0.43
Stability* 
Caribbean 
0.18 0.03 -0.15 -0.35 0.01 0.15 0.14
Regulation* 
Caribbean 
0.14 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.05 0.15 0.13
Total debt (% 
of exports) 
-0.24 -0.10 0.20 0.32 -0.02 0.14 0.02
    
Trade Law Regulation Stability Stability* 
Caribbean 
Regulation* 
Caribbean 
Total 
debt 
 (% of 
exports) 
    
Trade 1.00    
Law 0.30 1.00   
Regulation 0.11 0.74 1.00  
Stability 0.40 0.72 0.55 1.00  
Stability* 
Caribbean 
0.17 0.24 0.17 0.22 1.00 
Regulation* 
Caribbean 
0.11 0.22 0.24 0.15 0.70 1.00
Total debt (% 
of exports) 
-0.41 -0.07 0.11 -0.21 -0.09 -0.01 1.00
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Table A 7. The importance of the ICRG index. No trace of a separate Caribbean effect from 
improvements on the ICRG index. Dependent variable: FDI/GDP (logged) 
 Model 12 
Growth 0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Inflation 0.055** 
(0.027) 
Population (logged) 0.029 
(0.026) 
Mobil 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
GDP per capita (logged, PPP) -0.560*** 
(0.075) 
Trade 0.017*** 
(0.001) 
Trade*Caribbean 0.006 
(0.009) 
Law -0.802*** 
(0.095) 
Regulation 1.065*** 
(0.094) 
Stability 0.000 
(0.074) 
Stability*Caribbean 6.842 
(5.883) 
Regulation*Caribbean -5.014 
(4.626) 
ICRG 0.040*** 
(0.005) 
ICRG*Caribbean 0.008 
(0.006) 
Constant -0.650 
(0.656) 
Observations 1571 
2R  0.35 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
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Table A 8: Descriptive statistics, domestic investment regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dom.inv./GDP (logged) 2584 21.929 7.082 -0.691 60.099 
Trade/GDP 2584 74.053 41.707 6.320 296.016 
GDP per cap (logged,PPP) 2584 8.369 1.097 6.037 10.900 
Inflation (logged) 2584 2.154 1.458 -4.191 9.372 
Taxrevenue/GDP 1935 19.292 10.806 0.000 102.751 
Mobil 2584 50.172 142.603 0.000 1060.538 
Telephones 2584 157.136 191.412 0.189 796.823 
Voice 2584 0.157 0.915 -1.685 1.613 
Stability 2584 0.089 0.897 -2.393 1.640 
Effectiveness 2584 0.159 0.951 -1.770 2.230 
Regulation 2584 0.229 0.800 -2.388 1.688 
Law 2584 0.179 0.975 -1.820 2.165 
Corruption 2584 0.152 1.013 -1.563 2.390 
Population 2584 3.68E+07 1.20E+08 72000 1.27E+09 
Caribbean dummy 2584 0.067 0.251 0.000 1.000 
Trade*Caribbean 2584 6.637 26.553 0.000 213.328 
GDPcap*Caribbean 2584 0.569 2.124 0.000 9.668 
Stability*Caribbean 2584 0.017 0.145 -0.903 0.810 
Trade*Population 2584 1.53E+09 4.00E+09 7140619 6.19E+10 
GDPcap*Population 2584 3.00E+08 9.27E+08 585087 1.05E+10 
Stability*Population 2584 -4581746 6.35E+07 -5.45E+08 3.21E+08 
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Table A 9. Correlation matrix, domestic investment regressions, 2584 observations 
 
Dom.inv./ 
GDP  
(logged) Trade/GDP 
GDP per cap 
(logged,PPP)  
Inflation 
(logged) Mobil 
Tele-
phones Voice 
Dom.inv./GDP (logged) 1       
Trade/GDP 0.3295 1      
GDP per cap 
(logged,PPP)  0.1985 0.2308 1     
Inflation (logged) -0.0791 -0.1685 -0.2961 1    
Mobil 0.0062 0.1666 0.4039 -0.2709 1   
Telephones 0.078 0.1937 0.8345 -0.357 0.5429 1  
Voice 0.1444 0.165 0.7473 -0.2706 0.3173 0.7418 1 
Stability 0.2304 0.3223 0.7065 -0.3314 0.291 0.6899 0.8222 
Effectiveness 0.1566 0.2007 0.8307 -0.3672 0.3547 0.8281 0.8286 
Regulation 0.1435 0.1787 0.7782 -0.3186 0.3281 0.721 0.8481 
Law  0.1726 0.2192 0.8371 -0.3857 0.3551 0.8237 0.8365 
Corruption 0.1312 0.1894 0.8279 -0.3617 0.3596 0.844 0.8274 
Population 0.1106 -0.2379 -0.0632 -0.0083 -0.0292 -0.0528 -0.0831 
Caribbean dummy  0.0524 0.1579 0.0209 -0.0794 -0.055 -0.0408 0.1431 
Trade*Caribbean 0.0812 0.2325 0.0364 -0.0967 -0.0491 -0.0211 0.1792 
GDPcap*Caribbean 0.0497 0.1631 0.0306 -0.0832 -0.0541 -0.0336 0.1513 
Stability*Caribbean 0.0708 0.1704 0.1001 -0.113 -0.0205 0.0634 0.2086 
Trade*Population 0.1546 -0.1521 -0.0473 -0.0189 -0.0019 -0.0418 -0.1289 
GDPcap*Population 0.1135 -0.2478 -0.0262 -0.0174 -0.0159 -0.0194 -0.0595 
Stability*Population 0.0928 0.077 0.3142 -0.1505 0.1223 0.3164 0.255 
        
 Stability 
Effective-
ness Regulation Law  Corruption Population Caribbean 
Stability 1       
Effectiveness 0.8293 1      
Regulation 0.7839 0.8967 1     
Law  0.8435 0.9654 0.8828 1    
Corruption 0.8181 0.9653 0.8565 0.9709 1   
Population -0.0727 -0.0057 -0.0556 -0.0285 -0.0491 1  
Caribbean dummy  0.0486 -0.0742 -0.0175 -0.0469 -0.0442 -0.0773 1 
Trade*Caribbean 0.0713 -0.0398 0.0099 -0.0103 -0.0145 -0.0735 0.9304 
GDPcap*Caribbean 0.0561 -0.0603 -0.0072 -0.0364 -0.0333 -0.0773 0.9975 
Stability*Caribbean 0.1528 0.1077 0.1182 0.1194 0.11 -0.0376 0.4325 
Trade*Population -0.0758 -0.006 -0.0594 -0.0478 -0.0654 0.9045 -0.0934 
GDPcap*Population -0.0518 0.0221 -0.0293 -0.0015 -0.0224 0.996 -0.0817 
Stability*Population 0.4007 0.3191 0.3071 0.3154 0.3233 -0.2161 0.0172 
        
 
Trade* 
Caribbean 
GDPcap* 
Caribbean 
Stability* 
Caribbean 
Trade* 
Population 
GDPcap* 
Population 
Stability* 
Population  
Trade*Caribbean 1       
GDPcap*Caribbean 0.9368 1      
Stability*Caribbean 0.5628 0.4784 1     
Trade*Population -0.0887 -0.0935 -0.046 1    
GDPcap*Population -0.0776 -0.0817 -0.0395 0.9099 1   
Stability*Population 0.0176 0.0175 0.0138 -0.0667 -0.1658 1  
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Table A 10. Correlation matrix, domestic investment regressions, 1935 observations 
 
Dom.inv./ 
GDP  
(logged) Trade/GDP 
GDP per cap 
(logged,PPP)  Stability Population 
Taxrevenue/ 
GDP 
Dom.inv./GDP 
(logged) 1      
Trade/GDP 0.37 1     
GDP per cap 
(logged,PPP)  0.1854 0.1959 1    
Stability 0.2493 0.3357 0.7545 1   
Population 0.092 -0.2646 -0.0894 -0.0909 1  
Taxrevenue/GDP 0.2252 0.3443 0.539 0.5337 -0.1636 1 
 
  
Summary 
This study performs an econometric analysis to determine the 
main policy levers for investment promotion in the Caribbean. 
The results provide the following policy advice to Caribbean 
policy makers seeking to increase investment in, and hence the 
growth prospectives of, their countries. 
1. Investment, both foreign and domestic, is higher in 
countries that are open to international trade. Our results also 
suggest that Caribbean countries might see a greater effect of 
trade integration than other countries. Caribbean governments 
should therefore pursue regional trade arrangements, and 
actively support the WTO process of global trade 
liberalization. 
2. Investment, both foreign and domestic, is higher in 
countries whose domestic markets are larger and more 
advanced. Regional integration to expand what is considered 
the domestic market, is thus beneficial. 
3. Investment, both foreign and domestic, is higher in 
countries with greater political stability. To inspire confidence 
among investors, Caribbean countries should avoid major 
political disruptions, by pursuing inclusive and participatory 
policies. Our results suggest that investment is particularly 
responsive to stability issues in countries like Haiti, Guyana, 
Dominica, and Grenada. 
4. Foreign investors are discouraged by bad macro-
economic policies, poor infrastructure, and excessive 
regulation. Caribbean countries should avoid periods of high 
inflation and large debt burdens, and develop functional 
infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. 
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